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Represented under

Article 80(1) UK GDPR by:

Open Rights Group

The Society of Authors, 24 Bedford Row, London, WC1R 4EH

Respondent:

Meta Platforms, Inc.

1601 Willow Road, Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA

Regarding:

The use of personal data for undefined forms of "artificial intelligence technology" and the consequent violation of Articles 5(1) and (2), 6(1), 9(1), 12(1) and (2), 13(1) and (2), 17(1) (c), 18(1)(d), 19, 21(1) and 25 UK GDPR

COMPLAINT

OVERVIEW

Meta has announced plans to introduce changes to its privacy policy to irreversibly ingest the entire data sets of well over 50 million UK data subjects¹ for undefined “artificial intelligence” technologies, without any indication as to the purposes of such systems. Following several complaints filed in the European Union² and the intervention of the Irish Data Protection Commission,³ Meta has since paused its plans.⁴ However, absent changes in its privacy policy that would make this commitment legally binding and prevent Meta from resuming its plans at any point in time, we see the urgent need to file this complaint.

Meta appears to violate at least Articles 5(1) and (2), 6(1) 6(4), 9(1), 12, 13, 17(1)(c), 18, 19, 21(1) and 25 UK GDPR. At its core this complaint relies on the following elements:

- *First*, Meta has **no legitimate interest** under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR that would override the interest of the complainants (or any data subject) and no other legal basis to process such vast amounts of personal data for totally undefined purposes.
- *Second*, Meta actually attempts to get permission to process personal data for **undefined, broad technical means** (“*artificial intelligence technology*”) **without ever specifying the purpose** of the processing under Article 5(1)(b) UK GDPR.
- *Third*, Meta has taken every step to **deter data subjects from exercising their right to choose** by pretending that data subjects would only enjoy a right to object (“*opt-out*”) instead of relying on consent (“*opt-in*”) and by entertaining **extensive dark patterns** to deter users from objecting under Article 21 UK GDPR.

¹ According to The Global Statistics, https://www.theglobalstatistics.com/uk-social-media-usage-statistics/?utm_content=cmp-true, there are approximately 49 million Facebook users in the UK. There are also an estimated 37.73 million Instagram users in the UK. However, as there are no publicly accessible statistics which compile the number of total users for Meta, it is impossible to determine how many of these are unique users as opposed to users of one or more Meta platforms. Thus, we can only assume that the number is likely to be significantly higher than 50 million users.

² See *noyb urges 11 DPAs to immediately stop Meta's abuse of personal data for AI*, <https://noyb.eu/en/noyb-urges-11-dpas-immediately-stop-metas-abuse-personal-data-ai>

³ See *The DPC's Engagement with Meta on AI*, <https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/latest-news/dpcs-engagement-meta-ai>

⁴ See *Building AI Technology for Europeans in a Transparent and Responsible Way*, <https://about.fb.com/news/2024/06/building-ai-technology-for-europeans-in-a-transparent-and-responsible-way/>

- *Fourth*, Meta **fails to provide the necessary** "*concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible*" **information**, "*using clear and plain language*".
- *Fifth*, Meta says itself that it is **not able to properly differentiate** (i.) between data subjects where it can rely on a legal basis to process personal data and other data subjects where such a legal basis does not exist and (ii.) between personal data that falls under Article 9 UK GDPR and other data that does not.
- *Sixth*, Meta says itself that the **processing of personal data is irreversible** and it is unable to comply with the "right to be forgotten" once personal data of the complainants is ingested into (unspecified) "artificial intelligence technology".

As a consequence, and given that Meta itself claims that the processing of the complainants' personal data **cannot be reversed after training its large language model**, we apply (see chapter 3. below) that you take (among others) the following urgent action:

- *First*, issue an **imminent and legally binding decision under Article 58(2) UK GDPR** to prevent the processing of the personal data of the complainants – and over 50 million UK data subjects – without consent.
- *Second*, **fully investigate the matter** under Article 58(1) UK GDPR.
- *Third*, **prohibit the use of personal data for undefined "artificial intelligence technology"** without the opt-in consent form the complainants – and indeed other data subjects.

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1. FACTS OF THE CASE

The following is a short summary of facts at the time of the filing of this case. These facts may be supplemented by additional information that may arise during the next weeks and the course of the investigation:

1.1. Meta's changes to its privacy policy

1.1.1. Changes to the privacy policy

Meta has updated its privacy policy, available at <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/policy>, where users have to click on a link to the new policy.

The new policy was planned to go into effect on 26.06.2024, but has been paused since then.⁵ Meta has not provided a "redline" or other comparison document that allows any data subject to quickly understand the changes.

As far as we were able to see, the term "artificial" or "AI" is mentioned only under three headings in the privacy policy that amounts to 127 pages A4 if printed,⁶ namely:

- **In the intro section:**
 - The intro now reads: *"We're updating our Privacy Policy, including how we use your information for AI at Meta."*
- **Under the heading "*How do we use your information?*" (defining the purpose):**
 - Where under the subheading "*To research and innovate for social good*", the policy now says: *"We support research in areas such as artificial intelligence and machine learning."*
- **Once in a table headed "Performance of a contract" (defining the legal basis):**
 - Where the policy now reads: *"Provide and curate artificial intelligence technology in our Products, enabling the creation of content such as text, audio, images and videos, including by understanding and recognising your use of content in the features."*
- **Six times, in a table headed "Legitimate Interests" (defining the legal basis):**
 - Here the policy now reads: *"To develop and improve artificial intelligence technology (also called AI at Meta) we provide, on our Products and to Third Parties."*

⁵ See *Building AI Technology for Europeans in a Transparent and Responsible Way*, <https://about.fb.com/news/2024/06/building-ai-technology-for-europeans-in-a-transparent-and-responsible-way/>

⁶ Based on the new version, if the "printable version" is chosen and printed via a Firefox browser.

- Further down, the policy now reads: *"We support research in areas such as artificial intelligence and machine learning."*

→ *The updated privacy policy (of 127 printed pages) does not allow a normal data subject to understand the actual use of his or her personal data. We note that this description seems to be extremely vague and even conflicting.*

→ *In particular, the added wording on the purposes ("innovate for social good") and the adjusted wording on the legal basis (indicating the use of personal data for undefined "artificial intelligence technology" in the interest of the Meta and third parties) are conflicting.*

1.1.2. Use for undefined "artificial intelligence technology"

Meta informs data subjects that their data will be used by undefined "*artificial intelligence technology*" - an extremely broad term describing an undefined set of vaguely connected long-established, current and future technologies.

The English Wikipedia alone lists countless different techniques that can be considered an "*artificial intelligence technology*" with vastly different applications and implications for data subjects. They include: Search and optimization, various forms of logic, probabilistic methods, classifiers and statistical learning, artificial neural networks, deep learning, generative pre-trained transformers (GPT), large language models (LLMs), machine learning, neural networks, Generative AI, face recognition, translation of texts, predictive technologies and many more.⁷ Wikipedia defines "Artificial Intelligence" as "*in its broadest sense, [the] intelligence exhibited by machines, particularly computer systems.*"⁸

Example: While it may be less of an interference if a system is trained to understand speech (speech recognition) a data subject may not be happy if his voice is used to generate a computer voice that resembles him or her ("voice clone") or if his or her data is used for credit ranking, ads, health predictions or to calculate insurance premiums.

Meta does not disclose which type of "*artificial intelligence technology*" it is intending to use personal data with – let alone for which purpose.

⁷ See as an example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_intelligence. This random list is intended to show that there is no common understanding for what would constitute "*artificial intelligence technology*" and what does not.

⁸ See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_intelligence

1.2. Scope of processing

Meta's intended processing of personal data is exceptionally broad. It is also highly questionable whether Meta is able to properly separate personal data that (i.) falls under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR, (ii.) falls under the application of the UK GDPR and (iii.) falls under successful objection under Article 21 UK GDPR.

The exact processing is a matter for further investigation by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) pursuant to Article 58(1) UK GDPR; the information below is naturally a preliminary summary:

1.2.1. No limitation based on the type of personal data

Meta does currently not limit the amount or the type of personal data that may be used to train AI systems. Under "*Where does Meta get training information?*", Meta says:

"As it takes such a large amount of data to teach effective models, a combination of sources are used for training. We use information that is publicly available online and licensed information. We also use information shared on Meta's Products and services. This information could be things such as posts or photos and their captions. We do not use the content of your private messages with friends and family to train our AIs. There are more details on how we use information from Meta's Products and services in our Privacy Policy.

*When we collect public information from the internet or license data from other providers to train our models, it may include personal information. For example, if we collect a public blog post it may include the author's name and contact information. When we do get personal information as part of this public and licensed data that we use to train our models, we don't specifically link this data to any Meta account.*⁹

There is only one (tiny) exemption to the sweeping claims by Meta, namely "private messages" between two individual users. It is worth noting that any other form of private communication, like chats with a business, a Facebook page or within a closed Facebook group does not seem to be covered by this exception.

→ ***In other words, any data on Meta platforms and any data off Meta platforms (other than individual-to-individual chats) may be used for the processing operations.***

⁹ See <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/genai/>

1.2.2. No limitation for “specific purposes” as required by Article 5 UK GDPR

Meta also does not limit the purpose for which these AI systems may be used in the future, as it simply declares the development of AI systems itself as the purpose of the processing operation. There is no differentiation between the following examples:

- An AI system to detect bots, illegal behaviour and the like (*security*)
- An AI system that allows users to interact and answer questions (*“assistant”*)
- An AI system to help improve uploaded pictures by users (*“photo filters”*)
- An AI system to help find more relevant information in the newsfeed (*personalization*)
- An AI system for external credit ranking companies (*“credit ranking”*)
- An AI system for companies to make hiring decisions (*“automated decision making”*)
- An AI system to allow advertisers to exploit users’ weaknesses (*“psychological ads”*)
- An AI system to allow political parties to influence elections (*“political influence”*)
- An AI system to allow the government to find potential future criminals
- An AI system can be used for self-driving cars, but also military drones
- An AI system tasked with the creation of as many paper clips as possible¹⁰

→ *Obviously, this list is just a random example, but it shows that **Meta is trying to make an entire group of data processing technologies itself the alleged “purpose”** under Article 5(1)(b) UK GDPR. Usually technologies are not a purpose, but rather a “means” in the UK GDPR.*

1.2.3. No time limit, allowing use of very old personal data

We note that Meta has not proposed any limitation on the age of the training data. Meta seems to try to use its many “dormant” accounts as a source for personal data, when the user may not even be aware of or reacting to messages concerning Meta. This allows Meta to generate revenue even from data subjects that have not substantially used the service in years (*“data recycling”*). Such data should usually have been subject to deletion routines under Article 5(1)(e) UK GDPR, which Meta has never implemented.

¹⁰ See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumental_convergence#Paperclip_maximizer

1.2.4. No anonymisation or pseudonymisation of personal data

We note that Meta does not even claim to foresee that personal data is minimised or limited in any way, shape or form.

Notably, the UK GDPR usually foresees processes like anonymisation or (at least) pseudonymisation as approaches to implement requirements under Article 5 UK GDPR or to comply with the duty to have "*data protection by design and by default*".

None of the documents that Meta provided to the complainants contain any hint, let alone clear legal undertaking, in that direction.

1.2.5. Forwarding of personal data to any "third party"

Meta also does not limit the use of personal data (that will be contained in any AI model) to internal use by Meta or within the Meta products, but explicitly foresees that any "*artificial intelligence technology*" may also be provided to "*third parties*":

*"To develop and improve artificial intelligence technology (also called AI at Meta) we provide, on our Products and to Third Parties."*¹¹

Meta's wording also explicitly foresees that third parties may "*discover ... information*" via its artificial intelligence technology:

*"To create, provide, support and maintain artificial intelligence technology that enables people, businesses, and others to express themselves, communicate, and discover and engage with information relevant to their interests."*¹²

While Meta has some information pages, that e.g. name specific third parties for "Generative AI models",¹³ this is not reflected in the (legally relevant) privacy policy.

- ➔ *Overall, the setup makes it clear that Meta anticipates that **personal data of the complainants and all other 4 billion Meta users may be provided to any "third parties" via Meta's AI systems.***
- ➔ *Obviously "third parties" is a euphemism for "**anyone in the world**".*

1.2.6. Summary: No limitation on the processing operations

In summary, Meta's description of the processing operation foresees none of the typical limitations for the processing of personal data. It seems that Meta is

¹¹ See <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/policy/version/25238980265745528>

¹² See <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/policy/version/25238980265745528>

¹³ See <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/dialog/ai-partners/>

trying to use the current hype around AI technology and the lack of understanding about it to “slip through” processing operations that would otherwise never be tolerated.

→ *Meta foresees the use of any personal data (on Meta or from a third party), for any purpose (by just declaring “AI” to be the “specific purpose”), with no time limit, with no form anonymisation or pseudonymisation and potentially with anyone in the world as the recipient of information from these systems.*

1.3. Foreseeable technical problems in Meta’s implementation

Based on Meta’s own submissions in other UK GDPR related cases, it is obvious that the proposed approach by Meta to have a proper and clear legal basis for any individual piece of information is not achievable in the way Meta is currently conducting the processing.

1.3.1. Lack of separation between data subjects that agree and/or object

The functioning of a social network, where data is often shared or mixed, would usually mean that any objection would (technically) not apply to data that is not directly linked to an account. Meta itself explains that it cannot separate personal data of (non-)users from users of its services:

“Even if you don’t use our Products and services or have an account, we may still process information about you to develop and improve AI at Meta. For example, this could happen if you appear anywhere in an image shared on our Products or services by someone who does use them or if someone mentions information about you in posts or captions that they share on our Products and services.”¹⁴

Equally, Meta admits in the opt-out form that it cannot really separate the personal data from people that opted out from the personal data of other users:

“We may still process information about you to develop and improve AI at Meta, even if you object or don’t use our Products and services. For example, this could happen if you or your information:

- *Appear anywhere in an image shared on our Products or services by someone who uses them*
- *Are mentioned in posts or captions that someone else shares on our Products and services”¹⁵*

¹⁴ See <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/genai/>

¹⁵ See <https://help.instagram.com/contact/233964459562201> (for Instagram) and <https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/6359191084165019> (for Facebook).

The same technical limitation obviously applies to the use of personal data of various users of the service, such as when a user that objected is in a picture that was uploaded by a user that did not object.

1.3.2. Lack of separation between personal data under Article 6 and 9

Even when it comes to the personal data of a specific data subject, Meta has long maintained that it is technically unable to differentiate between personal data falling under Article 6 UK GDPR and so-called “sensitive” data, that is protected by Article 9 UK GDPR.

In fact, Meta is currently facing litigation before the CJEU in C-446/21 *Schrems*, where Meta has submitted that it “*does not separate*” special categories of data in accordance with Article 9 UK GDPR and other categories of data and would therefore be unable to comply with Article 9 UK GDPR.

Given that Meta is repeatedly on record stating that it does not distinguish between data falling under Article 9 UK GDPR and other personal data – even before the CJEU – it seems probable that such differentiation would also be lacking when user data is used to train an AI model. The same problem also applies to personal data covered by Article 10 UK GDPR.

As explained in more detail below, Article 9 UK GDPR does not foresee the use of special categories of personal data for “*legitimate interests*”, but such personal data would nevertheless be used to train Meta’s AI systems under the same legal basis too.

1.3.3. Lack of separation between UK personal data and other data

Furthermore, Meta has repeatedly argued that its data processing is a unified global system and cannot be “*separated*”. In litigation on EU-US data transfers (see EDPB Decision 1/2023), Meta has expressed that it is technically unable to have a “clean cut” between personal data that falls under the scope in Article 3 UK GDPR and personal data of users that may not be subject to the UK GDPR (e.g. non-UK users).¹⁶

For the complainants, this means that no matter if an objection is filed and approved, it is highly likely that personal data is still processed.

→ *Meta itself says that it cannot properly separate UK personal data from other personal data. It seems highly questionable that Meta can properly apply limitations to all UK data subjects on globally interconnected social networks.*

¹⁶ This decision has been treated as confidential by the Irish Data Protection Commission and disclosure of the facts therein may thus be subject to a criminal penalty under Section 26A of the Data Protection Act 2018. Please refer to the Irish DPC for a copy or an agreement to send the complaint in full.

1.4. Personal data cannot be “forgotten” from an AI system

As already apparent from other artificial intelligence systems like Large Language Models that are based on artificial neural networks (see, e.g., the *noyb* complaint on OpenAI),¹⁷ personal data that is once entered into an AI system cannot (according to the controllers) be “unlearned”, “forgotten”, deleted or rectified.

Meta itself says that any future objection would not influence the use of personal data that the system was already trained on:

“We’ll review objection requests in accordance with relevant data protection laws. If your request is honoured, it will be applied going forward.”¹⁸

It therefore seems likely that an “objection” after the training of a Meta’s Large Language Model will not have the effect that personal data is not processed within the LLM anymore – contrary to the obligations under Article 17 UK GDPR (“*right to be forgotten*”). This irreversible approach by controllers is not just a violation of the UK GDPR, but an additional factor that gravely undermines the rights and freedoms of data subjects.

→ *Meta itself says that UK GDPR rights cannot be complied with after the training of a large language model has taken place and any exercise of rights may not stop the further processing of personal data that was already used as training data.*

1.5. Information to the complainants via email


Article 12 UK GDPR requires information in “*concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language*” and requires controllers to “*facilitate the exercise of data subject rights under Articles 15 to 22*”. Meta has done exactly the opposite:

¹⁷ See e.g. https://noyb.eu/sites/default/files/2024-04/OpenAI%20Complaint_EN_redacted.pdf

¹⁸ See objection form at <https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/6359191084165019>

1.5.1. Deceptive subject line with no hint on AI or the right to object (CTA)

The complainants were notified about changes via an email with the subject “*We’re updating our Privacy Policy as we expand AI at Meta*”.



Screenshot: Meta emails as seen in a normal Microsoft Outlook Live inbox

In most email programs only “*We are updating our Privacy...*” would be visible. It is basic knowledge in email marketing that the first 2-3 words of an email subject line are the principal factors determining whether emails are opened. As a result, the relevant “*call to action*” (CTA) should always be apparent from the first 2-3 words.¹⁹


Meta’s subject line alone indicates that this email is not worth reading, as privacy policies are updated all the time – especially if a user has not visited the page within the last week and is therefore likely a rather inactive user.

- ➔ *The first 2-3 words and a clear “call to action” in a subject line is known to be the main factor why emails are even opened by users.*
- ➔ *Meta has not included any relevant elements into the first words of the subject line.*
- ➔ *Meta is fully aware of this factor, given that all other communication by Meta follows these basic design principles.*

1.5.2. No “call to action” (CTA) in the email – contrary to other Meta emails


Usually, Meta sends emails with a clear graphical “*call to action*” (CTA), usually in the form of a big blue button, highlighting the option for a user to interact or choose something:

¹⁹ As one of many examples: <https://mailchimp.com/de/help/best-practices-for-email-subject-lines/>



Screenshot: Meta marketing email with clear CTAs in subject (German for “Please agree to our guidelines against discrimination”), headline and with blue button.

The email sent to exercise the right to object under Article 21 UK GDPR did not have any such common CTA, but instead an in-line text link, usually used for further information – not for a user action or choice, which is commonly communicated via a button (see above).



Screenshot: Meta UK GDPR notification with no CTAs in subject, headline or a button.

➔ *The lack of a “call to action” is known to be another major reason why users “drop off” in a user engagement flow. Meta therefore (otherwise) always communicates clearly.*

1.5.3. Meta's email links are aimed to block access to information and the right to object

Even though the information about the opt-out was delivered to the email address with which the user can even get a new password (so the most "secure" channel Meta entertains) and the link in the email contained a "token" that identified the data subject, these tokens were not used to allow the data subject to identify itself.

Instead, the tokens were actually used to demand unnecessary extra login steps, even when visiting an otherwise publicly available website.

Information links used in Meta's emails had the following structure:

```
https://www.facebook.com/n/?privacy%2Fgenai
%2F&entry_point=notification&aref=1717109508947928&medium=email&mid=619b36cbc
3d06G5af49c00df46G619b3b6523fd8G8151&n_m=[email_address]&rms=v2&irms=true
```


Objection links used in Meta's emails had the following structure:

```
https://www.facebook.com/n/?help%2Fcontact
%2F6359191084165019&aref=1717137977463652&medium=email&mid=619ba0d975092G5a
f4aca38af4G619ba572d5364G8151&n_m=[email address]&rms=v2&irms=true
```

The email links had the following elements:

Value Name	Value	Description
http://...&	URL of objection form	The text until the first "&" is the link to the objection form, the rest refer to tokens/values
entry_point	notification	Likely a tracking token on where a user entered the page
aref	1717137977463652	Likely a link reference ("a" as in <a>")
medium	email	Type of contact (here, via email)
mid	619ba0d975092G5af4aca38af4G619ba572d5364G8151	Unknown, likely a user ID or ID of the email that was sent to the user ("MID")
n_m	[email address]	The email address of the user account
rms	v2	Unknown
irms	boolean (true / false)	Unknown

If a user clicked on the link in the email without being logged in, Meta was able to know the user's email address, given that the personalized link above was actually transferring all necessary data to link an objection with the user account:



Screenshot: Personalized login request, showing the email of a ORG staffer when clicking the objection link in a “clean” browser. Login and entry of email still required in next steps.

While these tokens show that Meta was actually personalizing links and had the technical options, it did not use them to make the objection easier - via a single click (like “unsubscribe” links in all newsletters which are an equivalent objection under Article 21(2) UK GDPR, which have the user ID, email address or a unique token encoded in the link).

→ *Meta did not provide a single click opt-out (similar to “unsubscribe” links).*

In more detail on the “information link”:

The information email had a link to the general information about Meta’s new AI systems at <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/genai/>.

However, if the link from the email is used, the additional tokens (see above at 1.5.3.) lead to the system showing a “login page” (same as in the screenshot above) – requiring another login to even see privacy information, which is otherwise publicly available.

Data subjects were forwarded to a URL like the following instead of the information page:

[https://www.facebook.com/recover/initiate/?privacy_mutation_token=eyJ0eXBlljo1LCJjcmVhdGlvbl90aW1***&cuid=\[encrypted_email_or_phone_number_of_user\]&ars=bypass_login_deny_smart_recommendation&ram=email&lara_product=lara_bypass_login_fail_loop](https://www.facebook.com/recover/initiate/?privacy_mutation_token=eyJ0eXBlljo1LCJjcmVhdGlvbl90aW1***&cuid=[encrypted_email_or_phone_number_of_user]&ars=bypass_login_deny_smart_recommendation&ram=email&lara_product=lara_bypass_login_fail_loop)

→ *Meta required an additional login just to read the basic information about the changes to the privacy policy on an otherwise public page.*

In more detail on the “objection link”: No “one click” option

Usually controllers implement “one click” option e.g. to give consent, but also to unsubscribe from a newsletter. This is done via exactly such tokens as in the Meta link above, by providing a “token” that codes for the specific data subject and allows the server to know (with one click) that a specific user has unsubscribed or consented. There is then no need to log in to exercise UK GDPR rights.

Despite the technical possibility to have a “one click” objection, Meta has also asked users to log in (see screenshot at 1.5.3. above) when they wanted to submit an objection.

Especially as users may get the email on a device (desktop versus phone) or medium (browser versus app) that is different from their normal use of the Meta services, many users would likely have to find the password to login, which they never need after setup when just opening the app. This need to login thus further disincentivised the objection.

- *Despite having the technical means to have a “one click” objection (like a newsletter “unsubscribe”), Meta has instead used these technical means to require another login.*
- *Logins are known to be another major reason why users “drop off” in a flow.*

1.5.4. Requirement to go back and click on the link in the email again

After they logged in, as Meta required to access the objection form, data subjects were not shown the form but were instead forwarded on the “newsfeed”.

Data subjects therefore had to go back to the email and click the link a second time (while now being logged in) to even reach the form.

- *The flow dropped the data subject to a page other than the objection form.*

1.6. Deceptive online form to exercise a right to object

Meta’s excessive use of “dark patterns” to minimize the number of data subjects that would exercise their right to object also continued on the online form:

1.6.1. Requirement to provide wholly irrelevant personal data

While Article 12(2) UK GDPR requires that controllers “*facilitate*” the exercise of rights – including the right to object under Article 21 UK GDPR – and Article 5(1)(c) UK GDPR requires data minimisation, Meta seems to have designed the objection form with the intent of discouraging data subjects by requiring totally irrelevant information:

Re-entry of known & irrelevant country details

In order to object, the user needed to be logged in to allegedly confirm that he or she resides in a country that has a right to object – but from the point of login, Meta is already aware of the user’s account and knows that a data subject has the right to object.²⁰

For this reason, Meta did not need to know the exact country that a data subject resides in to process to the objection.

→ *The mandatory selection of a country seems to have the sole purpose of discouraging data subjects from filling out the form.*

Re-entry of known and irrelevant email details

As shown above (see description of link tokens under 1.5.3. above), Meta already shares the email address with its systems when a data subject clicks on the link. In addition, Meta has an email address of every user on file (indeed the complainants got an email by Meta in the first place) and users have to log in to even reach the form. Thus, there is also no reason to have users type in the email address another time.

→ *The mandatory entry of an email address seems to have the sole purpose of discouraging data subjects from filling out the form.*

Need to give reasons for the objection

While Article 21(1) UK GDPR allows controllers to demand “*grounds relating to his or her particular situation*” to process an objection, most data subjects will not know which grounds they have to argue here, as they are not lawyers and are unfamiliar with the concept of legitimate interests and the interplay of Article 6(1)(f) and 21 UK GDPR.

In addition, Meta has not disclosed their “legitimate interest” analysis under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR, which makes it (even for well-trained lawyers)

²⁰ If users are not logged in they saw a screen saying “*This form is only available to people in certain regions who have an active Instagram account. Make sure you log into your Instagram account and then try again*”.

impossible to know if a certain factor was indeed already taken into account or not and is therefore a "*ground relating to his or her particular situation*".

As described under 1.6.2. below, it seems wholly irrelevant what a data subject entered in this field – further showing that Meta only used this field as a deterrent.

→ *The mandatory entry to give "reasons" seems to have the sole purpose of discouraging data subjects from filling out the form.*

1.6.2. Fake "review" process

Persons that did opt-out consistently reported that the objection were "approved" instantly – usually within a minute. In a test by Open Rights Group, the objection raised by Aislinn Lambert with a generically-worded specific ground under Article 21(1) UK GDPR were approved within 50 seconds. There are no public reports about objections that were not approved by Meta.

Overall, this indicates that the complicated form and the need to argue the objection was not required for a material review by Meta, but instead only served as a "dark pattern" to discourage data subjects from submitting an objection.


→ *The alleged review seems to be a mere automatic approval, meaning that a simple click of a button would have been sufficient to "object" under Article 21 UK GDPR.*

1.6.3. Overview of opt-out process as a "conversion funnel" via email

When user engagement flows are designed, they are usually mapped as a "funnel" where each click and step is analysed. UI/UX designers generally do everything they can to avoid any steps that may not be crucially necessary, as each step means "losing" users.

Overall, Meta has introduced 11 steps (!) to file an objection under Article 21(1) UK GDPR, when this could have been done with a single opt-out button in the email or app.

When the Meta objection flow is mapped as such a "conversion funnel", it becomes evident that Meta has done everything to add more (useless, boring or deceptive) steps (in red below) in an attempt to have data subjects not exercise their right to object:



Overview: Meta's objection "funnel" is designed to disengage data subjects.

It is painfully obvious that Meta has taken every step to ensure that it receives a minimal number of objections by using non-engaging language, bad UI/UX design and useless additional steps – the opposite of "*facilitating the exercise of the data subjects' rights*".

1.6.4. Simple way to seek objections in a user-friendly way

Overall, the objection could have been done with the push of a single button in the email itself (like e.g. most "unsubscribe" links in email newsletters under Article 21(2) UK GDPR). As shown under 1.5.2. above, Meta often uses such clear big blue buttons as CTA in its marketing emails.

➔ *Meta has deliberately made the access to the form substantially more complicated as necessary.*

1.7. Hidden and hideous second objection to the use of third-party data

We finally want to highlight that Meta only linked to a form allowing users to object against the use of personal data collected directly on Meta systems.

Only the third paragraph from the end of the lengthy information disclosure²¹ provided a **second link to a second form**,²² which allowed users to object to the use of personal data from external sources. Given that this second form was introduced only at the end of the privacy policy, it seems that the vast majority of data subjects has never realized that there were two forms.

Even when this form would be found by data subjects, it is basically useless, as it requires:

- the data subject to find personal data in an AI system,
- proof that it found such a result and upload a screenshot of such a result and
- an explanation of the “concern” and “what you are requesting”.

There seems to be **no option to object to the use of “third party” personal data in training datasets**, when such training data sets are based on web scraping or any form of external data sources or “third party” data.

→ *Meta has not informed users about the second form on third-party data. Even when users could find the “third party data set objection” form, Meta would not allow them to object to the use of their personal data for training purposes, it would only allow them to protest results that contain personal data.*

²¹ under <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/genai/>

²² available at <https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/510058597920541>

2. VIOLATIONS OF THE UK GDPR

2.1. The lack of a legal basis under Article 6(1) UK GDPR

The use of any personal data to train an AI model is clearly “processing” of personal data under Article 4(2) UK GDPR, which requires a “legal basis” under Article 6(1) UK GDPR, as processing of personal data is by default illegal under the UK GDPR.

Meta seems to rely on an alleged overriding “*legitimate interests*” under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR to justify the use of personal data (including postings, pictures, friendships, likes, following of pages, visits on third party pages, third party data or messages exchanged with businesses) of over 50 million UK data subjects.

2.2. ICO Guidance and EU case law on the limitations of ‘legitimate interest’ as a legal basis is clear

We are surprised that Meta is seriously arguing that it has a “legitimate interest” in using all the personal data of roughly 50 million UK to train its AI.

This approach is inconsistent with the ICO’s Guidance on Legitimate Interests, which notes that “legitimate interests” are an appropriate legal basis in limited contexts – in particular when, among other factors, the data subject “should reasonably expect you to use their data in that way.”²³ The processing of all personal data ever posted on Meta platforms for any purpose carried out through AI clearly does not align with data subjects’ expectations of the social platforms’ functions.

The reliance on “legitimate interests” also runs counter to the CJEU’s interpretation of the identical provision under the EU GDPR. The CJEU explicitly and clearly held in C-252/21 *Bundeskartellamt* that Meta does not even have a “legitimate interest” to use personal data for advertisement. It seems clear that the bar set by the CJEU would not allow for the irreversible ingestion of their personal data into undefined “artificial intelligence technology” without any purpose limitation and with an undisclosed number of recipients that will be able to access personal data ingested into such a system.

→ *Given the ICO’s guidance indicating the limited contexts in which “legitimate interests” is an appropriate legal basis as well as the CJEU’s*

²³ See ICO Guidance on legitimate interests as a lawful basis: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/lawful-basis/legitimate-interests/when-can-we-rely-on-legitimate-interests/#legitimate_appropriate.

clear view that the use for personalized advertisement is not a “legitimate interest”, the processing of personal data via new means for any purpose (in all likelihood including “personalized advertisement”) cannot be legal under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR.

For the avoidance of doubt, we nevertheless want to briefly highlight each element of the typical 3-step test under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR that Meta fails:

2.3. Lack of a “legitimate interest” under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR (Step 1)

According to the established 3-step test,²⁴ Meta must claim and prove to have a “legitimate interest”. In the current case, the analysis is already failing in the first step, as Meta neither claims – let alone proves – such a legitimate interest:

2.3.1. Meta relies on “technical means” – not a “legitimate interest”

Usually any “legitimate interest” analysis starts with the interest or the aim of the processing activity – in other words the “purpose” of the processing operation.

Analogue Example: If the aim is to “*go to Paris*”, then an “*airplane*” may be a means to reach that aim. However, “*airplane*” is not an aim in itself, let alone a legitimate interest.

UK GDPR Example: The processing of personal data cannot be justified by the wish to use a database system, a hard drive or an analytics software. It must be justified by the need to achieve an aim, purpose or interest. Meta is not even arguing an aim.

As further detailed under 1.3.2 above, Meta is not naming any purpose that it tries to achieve via AI systems, but is instead trying to bypass the normal analysis of a legitimate interest by simply declaring an entire type of processing (“AI”) itself to be a purpose:

²⁴ CJEU 4 May 2017, C-13/16 (*Rigas*), para. 28; *see also* ICO’s Generative AI first call for evidence: <https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/what-we-do/our-work-on-artificial-intelligence/generative-ai-first-call-for-evidence/> (noting that the controller must pass the three-part test).

<p>To develop and improve artificial intelligence technology (also called AI at Meta) we provide, on our Products and to Third Parties.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To create, provide, support and maintain artificial intelligence technology that enables people, businesses, and others to express themselves, communicate, and discover and engage with information relevant to their interests. • To offer artificial intelligence technology to Third Parties, including developers and researchers. • To develop and improve artificial intelligence technology in a consistent manner while ensuring appropriate safeguards, such as improving model responses for safety and accuracy. • To get feedback on how our users engage with artificial intelligence technology and to improve its performance. 	<p>Your activity and information you provide</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Content that you create, like posts, comments or audio. • Messages you send or receive from businesses, professional accounts, or Meta (such as to Meta's artificial intelligence technology), and messages in features designed to be public, including message content and metadata, subject to applicable law. • Apps and features you use, and what actions you take in them <p>Information from</p>
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Screenshot: Relevant disclosure of the “legitimate interests” by Meta in the new privacy policy.

This falls short of the first step’s requirement. As the ICO has noted, controllers “need to frame the interest in a specific, rather than open-ended way...”²⁵ In this case, the alleged purpose of processing “*To develop and improve artificial intelligence technology*”) is far too open-ended. It is just as much of a purpose or a legitimate interest as any other means to process personal data (like “*store all data in a database*”, “*run a social network*”, “*find correlations in your data*” or “*to do Big Data analysis*”). What Meta is describing is not a purpose, but means (see e.g. Article 4(7) UK GDPR “*purposes and means*”) to achieve various purposes.

Even if “*develop and improve artificial intelligence technology*” were a purpose, it would not constitute a “specific” purpose, as required under Article 5(1)(b) UK GDPR. For example, Wikipedia defines “artificial intelligence” as:

“Artificial intelligence (AI), in its broadest sense, is intelligence exhibited by machines, particularly computer systems.”²⁶

- ➔ Overall, the mere use of a technology (the use of certain “means” in the wording of UK GDPR) is not a “legitimate interest”.
- ➔ Meta tries to make the processing of personal data itself a “legitimate interest”.

2.3.2. “Legitimate interests” recognised by the UK GDPR are usually defensive

The examples in Recital 47 to 49 of the UK GDPR are predominantly defensive legitimate interests (like network security, information security or preventing

²⁵ See ICO’s Generative AI first call for evidence: <https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/what-we-do/our-work-on-artificial-intelligence/generative-ai-first-call-for-evidence/>, under “Our analysis.”

²⁶ See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_intelligence

fraud). In such cases, the legislator has indicated an openness to recognise the processing of personal data as a “legitimate interest”, given that the controller is merely acting in a defensive way.

Instead, Meta seems to want to offensively use the personal data of over 50 million UK data subjects to extract profits from (often long abandoned) social media profiles. The UK GDPR and its recitals do not provide or hint that such processing of personal data could be seen as a legitimate interest.

2.3.3. Making money itself is not a “legitimate interest”

Despite claims to the opposite by controllers, the mere interest in making money is itself not a “legitimate interest”, as can be seen from the countless decisions on the sale of personal data, the use for personalized advertisement and the like.²⁷

2.3.4. Mere data extraction is itself not a “legitimate interest”

Equally, it is not a legitimate interest to simply buy and collect personal data from third parties (“*data brokerage*”) and use internal data for totally unrelated new business ideas.

If the mere extraction of personal data from various systems to support any type of new processing for any undefined purpose were a “legitimate interest”, this would literally mean that any controller could use any personal data from any source for any new purpose. This narrative entertained by Meta is therefore totally outside of the common understanding under the UK GDPR.

2.3.5. Violation of Articles 5, 12, 13, 17(1)(c), 18, 19, 21(1) and 25 UK GDPR

As demonstrated below (see 2.6. to 2.10.) the proposed AI system of Meta and the way it was introduced clearly violates at least Articles 5(1), 5(2) 12, 13, 17(1) (c), 19, 21(1) and 25 UK GDPR. The violation of other provisions of the UK GDPR is another major factor, and why any balancing of interests under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR must fail.

An artificial intelligence system that is based on the violation of eight (!) Articles of the UK GDPR in one go cannot ever be seen as “legitimate”.

²⁷ See e.g. <https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/documenten/ap-normuitleg-grondslag-gerechtigd-belang>

2.3.6. Inclusion of “sensitive data” under Article 9 UK GDPR

Meta has had a history of failing to distinguish between data falling under Article 9 UK GDPR – which cannot rely on a “legitimate interest” as a legal basis – and other personal data.

For instance, in its request for a preliminary ruling in C-446/21, Margin Number 16, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) states that Meta's “*data processing does not distinguish between ‘simple’ personal data and ‘sensitive’ data*”. Additionally, in its Binding Decisions 03/2022 and 04/2023, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) asked the Irish Data Protection Commission (DPC) to investigate the use of data that falls under Article 9 EU GDPR by Meta. Meta and the DPC have continued to resist this decision.²⁸

The same factual circumstances must be true for personal data used by Meta for AI systems. We therefore note that Meta also lacks the option to rely on a “legitimate interest” as it clearly tries to process personal data that does not fall under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR and were relying on a “legitimate interest” is simply not available under the UK GDPR.

2.3.7. Lack of separation between data subjects’ personal data

As already explained in section 1.4.1., Meta admits that it is not in a position to separate personal data of (i.) data subjects that objected and (ii.) personal data relating to data subjects that did not object (and that potentially are not even Meta’s users).

This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Meta’s users that objected could still have some of their data processed when it was uploaded or published by other users. It is thus reasonable to assume that the right to object under Article 21(1) UK GDPR cannot be fully complied with.

Reliance on legitimate interest as a legal basis always requires compliance with the law, including that the data subject has the right to object. As this is not always possible, or at least not for all data, Meta cannot use Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR for this processing activity.

2.3.8. Summary on the existence of a “legitimate interest”

The first step of the 3-step test already fails and can be summarized as follows:

²⁸ Meta and the DPC and filed annulment procedures before the General Court against the EDPB (see T-70/23 and T-129/23).

- Overall, it seems obvious that Meta neither claims – let alone proves – that it pursues any legitimate interest recognizable under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR.
- The mere use of a broad category of various technologies constitutes co-called “means” not a legitimate interest in itself.
- Compared to the legitimate interests named in the UK GDPR or accepted in case-law, the mere extraction of personal data to use for commercial gain is not a “legitimate interest”.
- Finally, Meta tries to process an enormous pool of personal data, which (at least partly) contains personal data that cannot be processed based on a “legitimate interest”.

2.4. All data for any purpose is not strictly necessary processing (Step 2)

The second element of the legitimate interest test requires that personal data be “*strictly necessary*”. This step overlaps with the principle of data minimisation in Article 5(1)(c) UK GDPR and the duty to engage in data protection by design and by default in Article 25 UK GDPR (see below).

The ICO’s Guidance on Legitimate Interests notes that the necessity test requires assessing less intrusive alternatives:

“whether the processing is proportionate and adequately targeted to meet its objectives, and whether there is any less intrusive alternative, ie can you achieve your purpose by some other reasonable means without processing the data in this way? If you could achieve your purpose in a less invasive way, then the more invasive way is not necessary.”²⁹

The question is not whether the processing would be better, easier or more convenient for the controller, but if it is “strictly necessary” to reach an aim or purpose.³⁰ It is clear that the “strictly necessary” test must fail for Meta:

- It should be stressed that assessing the necessity of a certain processing operation is very difficult when the specific purposes are not even disclosed. As stated above, “*artificial intelligence technology*” is not a purpose but

²⁹ See the ICO’s Guidance on Legitimate Interests, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/lawful-basis/legitimate-interests/what-is-the-legitimate-interests-basis/#when_is_processing, under “When is processing ‘necessary’?”. Similarly, see *C-252/21 Bundeskartellamt*, in which the CJEU held at paragraph 108 that:

“...that condition requires the referring court to ascertain that the legitimate data processing interests pursued cannot reasonably be achieved just as effectively by other means less restrictive of the fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects, in particular the rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter...”

³⁰ See CJEU 4 May 2017, C-13/16 *Rigas*, para. 30. The ICO Guidance itself cites directly to this case as the source of the legitimate interest balancing test, lending it credence.

rather a broad group of means of processing. Processing can never be “necessary” to entertain technological “means”.

- That being said, whatever the purposes may be, it is highly unlikely that they strictly require the use of all personal data of all UK users (excluding the content of private chats), without any anonymisation or pseudonymisation measures in place and with no time limit.
- This can also be demonstrated by the fact that many controllers have already developed “artificial intelligence technologies” without the use of such vast data sources.
- In addition, it must be noted that the fact that only some types of “artificial intelligence technologies” require a large amount of data to be trained does not authorise Meta to process any data potentially available to them. For example, “Reactive Machines” fall under the definition of “artificial intelligence” and are not based on past experiences to take decisions. It can therefore not logically be “strictly necessary” to use all personal data for any “artificial intelligence technology”.

→ *Overall, it seems obvious that Meta attempts to process personal data far beyond anything that is “strictly necessary” for the (undisclosed) potential purposes.*

→ *This can also be demonstrated by the many existing AI systems that were trained and run on much smaller dataset.*

2.5. Meta can also not overcome the balancing test (Step 3)

Even if Meta would pursue a “legitimate interest” and the processing of (all) personal data it holds on data subjects would be “strictly necessary”, the third level of Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR – the overall “balancing” test – would also clearly fail for Meta:

2.5.1. Interpretation with reference to the EU Charter’s proportionality test

Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR’s balancing test is analogous to the proportionality test in Article 52(1) of the EU Human Rights Charter. European case law in this area offers persuasive reasoning:

- If under C-293/12 *Digital Rights Ireland* (and many following judgements by the CJEU) the “mere” storage of communication meta data for the rather important purpose of national security is not “proportionate”, how can the use of (almost) all personal data of a social network’s millions of users be “proportionate” to train an AI model with unclear future use?

- If in C-311/18 *Schrems II* the “mere” scanning of traffic data and the access to stored data for national security purposes violates Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, how can the use of all of this data be “proportionate” when training an AI model?
- If in joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 *Tele2* the “mere” retention of traffic data and location data for the purpose of fighting crime violates Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, how can the use of all this data be “proportionate” when training an AI model?

In comparison with CJEU case law on Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, it seems apparent that the use of much vaster amounts of personal data, for much more trivial purposes (like generating an AI picture or improving a chat bot) cannot be proportionate under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR.

2.5.2. Unlawful initial collection of personal data

Any balancing of interests must already fail, because Meta had largely no legal basis for the initial collection of large amounts of personal data that it has apparently used to train an AI model. In detail:

- Before the coming into force of the EU GDPR on 25.5.2018, Meta relied on consent under Article 7(a) of Directive 95/46. However, this consent was bundled, based on the mere use of the website (no “opt-in”) and was clearly far from compliant with Article 4(11) EU GDPR. Meta can therefore not rely on consent obtained from data subjects up until 25.5.2018 for the processing of personal data.
- In the EU, the EDPB Decisions 03/2022 and 04/2022, as well as the CJEU judgement in C-252/21 *Bundeskartellamt* found that Meta did not have a proper legal basis under legitimate interest to collect large parts of the personal data that it obtained between 25.5.2018 and at least until 01.11.2023 when Meta switched to “pay or okay”. The ICO took note of Meta’s “plans to seek consent from users for behavioural advertising in the EU, to the exclusion of the UK” and tabled an assessment on “what this means for information rights of people in the UK.”³¹

We therefore note that large quantities of the personal data that are now being used to train Meta’s AI model were not obtained legally and may therefore not be processed further. This factor alone would usually be a reason why an overriding legitimate interest (in further processing illegally obtained data) cannot be found.

³¹ See ICO Statement on Meta, <https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/media-centre/news-and-blogs/2023/08/ico-statement-on-meta/>.

2.5.3. Exceptionally large and unlimited amount of personal data

Furthermore, the personal data that is meant to be processed by Meta goes far beyond any “data pool” that was ever used for similar purposes:

- The processing concerns all personal data since the complainants signed up to the service – spanning a long time and including deleted personal data,³² archived data and personal data of other users. The personal data stored with Meta can amount to thousands of A4 pages per single user in just a couple of years.³³
- Such information can contain sensitive information revealing political leaning, financial background, sexual orientation or health problems, criminal offences, events that people attended or children’s data.
- The processing also concerns online tracking data that Meta collects on third pages, personal data uploaded by others (individuals and businesses) and the like.
- Already in 2014, Meta reported to keep 300 Petabytes of data and add another 4 Petabyte per day.³⁴ Now, ten years later, these numbers have massively increased.

Compared to typical examples of an overriding “legitimate interest” (e.g. the mere storage of CCTV pictures for a limited space and time or the keeping of an IP address for security reasons), Meta engages in processing of totally unheard-of dimensions for undefined future purposes.

2.5.4. Largely non-public personal data

The personal data processed by Meta is largely data from private postings, privately shared pictures, private events or the “liking” or “following” of topics and pages that are not visible to the general public and often not even to “friends” on social networks. In its official information shared with users, it states (without limiting these data to publicly posted content):

“We also use information shared on Meta’s Products and services. This information could be things such as posts or photos and their captions. We do not use the content of your private messages with friends and family to train our AIs.”³⁵

³² See e.g. http://europe-v-facebook.org/removed_content.pdf

³³ See e.g. the blackened (shorter) version of the 1.220 pages provided to Max Schrems in 2011: <http://europe-v-facebook.org/msb2.pdf>

³⁴ <https://research.facebook.com/blog/2014/10/facebook-s-top-open-data-problems/>

³⁵ See <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/genai/>

The privacy policy thus explicitly allows the use of any personal data (public, private, “on” Meta systems or “off” Meta systems, as well as any third-party data) for any purpose using “AI technology” and with anyone (any “third party”) as a recipient of the information.

However, even to the extent that public data is used, the ICO has been clear that publicly accessible information is still subject to data protection law.³⁶ In its Joint Statement on Data Scraping and Data Protection, it also noted that social media companies “*have obligations under data protection and privacy laws to protect personal information on their platforms from unlawful data scraping.*”³⁷ Presumably, that logic applies when Meta – a social media company with such obligations – is unlawfully scraping *from itself*.

The CJEU’s consistent approach to public personal data in cases such as C-362/14 *Schrems I*, C-311/18 *Schrems II* or C-468/10 *Asnef*, where it consistently held that non-public data is protected, especially communication data and content data, lends the Joint Statement persuasive support. It is obvious that Meta (operating a “social network”) is predominantly using “communication data” and/or “content data” for the relevant processing activities. More recently, in C-252/21 *Bundeskartellamt*, the CJEU was explicit that even rather public information, is not “fair game” and is generally protected by the EU GDPR:

“[...] Article 9(2)(e) of the GDPR must be interpreted as meaning that, where the user of an online social network visits websites or apps to which one or more of the categories set out in Article 9(1) of the GDPR relate, the user does not manifestly make public, within the meaning of the first of those provisions, the data relating to those visits collected by the operator of that online social network via cookies or similar storage technologies.

85. Where he or she enters information into such websites or apps or where he or she clicks or taps on buttons integrated into those sites and apps, such as the ‘Like’ or ‘Share’ buttons or buttons enabling the user to identify himself or herself on those sites or apps using login credentials linked to his or her social network user account, his or her telephone number or email address, that user manifestly makes public, within the meaning of Article 9(2)(e), the data thus entered or resulting from the clicking or tapping on those buttons only in the circumstance where he or she has explicitly made the choice beforehand, as the case may be on the basis of individual settings selected with full knowledge of the facts, to make the data relating to him or her publicly accessible to an unlimited number of persons.”

³⁶ ICO Joint Statement on Data Scraping and Data Protection,

<https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/4026232/joint-statement-data-scraping-202308.pdf>.

³⁷ ICO Joint Statement on Data Scraping and Data Protection,

<https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/4026232/joint-statement-data-scraping-202308.pdf>.

As noted above, Meta's processing is not limited publicly accessible data. However, even in the case that it is, the ICO's Joint Statement and the CJEU's persuasive cases demonstrate with clarity that Meta is processing data which: (1) requires a legal basis under the UK GDPR; (2) much of which is sensitive and not 'manifestly made public' within the meaning of Article 9(1) UK GDPR; and (3) Meta is obligated to protect from scraping.

2.5.5. High-risk technology with regular problems

In their current state, AI systems are still an unproven and speculative technology. This increases the risks for data subjects in an enormous way. Given that Meta also does not explain what the AI system will be used for, any product may be used against the interest of a data subject or may produce errors that lead to real-life consequences for the data subject.

This is not just theoretical, but very much the headlines of the past year(s). To name just some (of many) examples:

- Microsoft had to turn off an AI chatbot after it "*turned into a Nazi*".³⁸
- Google rolled back its AI Search function given countless errors.³⁹
- Facebook had to shut down AI bots after they spoke to each other in their own language, not understandable to humans anymore.⁴⁰
- OpenAI had its systems used for phishing and scams.⁴¹
- California has banned "self-driving" cars, following regular problems.⁴²

The lack of accurate results (see Article 5(1)(d) UK GDPR) and the overall unclear power and use of such systems makes the complainants fearful of having its own personal data ingested into such a system that may later also be used against the complainants.

The processing of personal data contrary to the interests of the data subject is another major factor that leads to a negative outcome in any balancing test.

2.5.6. No right to object once personal data is used ("No way back")

As outlined above at 1.5. Meta itself says that any objection can only concern the use of personal data "*going forward*". Contrary to Articles 17(1)(c), 19 and 21(1) UK GDPR, this means that while no new personal data may be ingested

³⁸ <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/microsoft-shuts-down-ai-chatbot-after-it-turned-into-racist-nazi/>

³⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/01/technology/google-ai-overviews-rollback.html>

⁴⁰ <https://www.firstpost.com/tech/news-analysis/facebook-researchers-shut-down-ai-bots-that-started-speaking-in-a-language-unintelligible-to-humans-3876197.html>

⁴¹ <https://tech.co/news/chatgpt-ai-scams-watch-out-avoid#phishing>

⁴² <https://slate.com/business/2023/10/cruise-suspended-california-robotaxis-self-driving-cars-san-francisco.html>

into an AI system, Meta foresees no way to delete personal data that its “artificial intelligence technology” was already trained on. This is the clear opposite of a “*right to be forgotten*”, which by definition also requires deletion of previously obtained personal data.

The fact that the use of personal data seems to be (technically) irreversible violates the right to object to any future processing under Article 21 UK GDPR.

Additionally, any processing of (public) personal data must end as soon as the published data is deleted.⁴³ The system of Meta does not allow to remove such data once any personal data is ingested into the system.

The fact that the processing is allegedly irreversible is another huge factor that would usually tip any balancing test towards a negative outcome.

2.5.7. Monopolistic role of Meta

Meta has “dominant market power”, profits from massive network effects and has an overall market penetration (over 50 million UK users).⁴⁴ Indeed, in 2023, the Competition and Markets Authority found that Meta had “engaged in conduct which abused, and continues to abuse, its dominant position in the market” to monetise its users’ personal data.⁴⁵

This power makes the use of such vast amounts of personal data about a large percentage of the UK residents an especially grave interference with the rights of data subjects, and limits their options to abandon such a network in the future, which is another factor in the balancing test.

2.5.8. Typical case of unlimited “secondary processing”

Sometimes the use of personal data for a closely related purpose (e.g. the option to apply an AI filter to an uploaded picture) may be in line with the expectations of a data subject and purposes of the processing.

However, the use of all personal data (no matter the purpose for which it was shared or generated) for an undisclosed future purpose contemplated by Meta via any form of current or future “artificial intelligence technology” is a typical

⁴³ See, for example, CJEU’s reasoning in the Joined Cases C-26/22 and C-64/22 *SCHUFA*.

⁴⁴ See the Competition and Market Authority’s Investigation into Meta’s use of data, Case AT 51013: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6543a5b7d36c910012935c7a/Meta_Final_Commitments_Decision_final.pdf; see also the EDPB Opinion 08/2024 on “pay or consent”, making similar findings.

⁴⁵ See the Competition and Market Authority’s Investigation into Meta’s use of data, Case AT 51013: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6543a5b7d36c910012935c7a/Meta_Final_Commitments_Decision_final.pdf.

case of unrelated “secondary processing”, which the UK GDPR explicitly tries to prevent.

2.5.9. Expectation of data subjects

The ICO has made explicit in its Guidance on Legitimate Interests that “the interests of the individual could in particular override [a controller’s] legitimate interests if [they] intend to process personal data in ways the individual does not reasonably expect.”⁴⁶

Data subjects have entered into agreement to share posting, watch cat pictures or chat with friends. There was no expectation of a data subject (that may have signed up years ago) that personal data entered into a social network would be used in 2024 to train AI systems with an undefined future purpose.⁴⁷

Meta’s anticipated processing for Meta AI includes all personal data entered into Meta systems since 2007. How could anyone using Facebook over one year ago – much less 17 years ago – could have reasonably expected that in 2024, their posts, comments, photos, captions and more would become fodder for an “*artificial intelligence technology*”?⁴⁸

This cannot be overcome by the update in the privacy policy, which vaguely refers to the use of all data for any artificial intelligence technology and thus provides too little information for a data subject to form any expectation at all. Nor can it be overcome by the information email (with deceptive subject lines, engagement flow and like, see above at 1.5. – 1.7.) or pop-up messages on the page.

2.5.10. Industry standards

While industry standards under the UK GDPR are often a “low bar” given that many controllers do not comply with the law, we want to note that we are not

⁴⁶ See ICO Guidance on legitimate interests as a lawful basis: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/lawful-basis/legitimate-interests/when-can-we-rely-on-legitimate-interests/#legitimate_appropriate.

⁴⁷ cf. Recital 47 UK GDPR: “[...] *At any rate the existence of a legitimate interest would need careful assessment including whether a data subject can reasonably expect at the time and in the context of the collection of the personal data that processing for that purpose may take place. The interests and fundamental rights of the data subject could in particular override the interest of the data controller where personal data are processed in circumstances where data subjects do not reasonably expect further processing.* [...]”

⁴⁸ For persuasive reasoning, see the CJEU decision in C-252/21 *Bundeskartellamt* para. 17, which found that “*the user of that network cannot reasonably expect that the operator of the social network will process that user’s personal data, without his or her consent, for the purposes of personalised advertising*”

aware of any consumer-facing controller that suggested that all personal data that was ever entered into its systems would be used to train “artificial intelligence technology”.

Most currently known systems (that can already be highly problematic in relation to the UK GDPR) are trained with dedicated data that was obtained by the controller (e.g. scans of streets for self-driving cars), publicly available information (e.g. web scraping) or otherwise limited in scope. We are not aware of any other consumer-facing controller to use all available personal data for AI systems.

Overall, this move by Meta (just like its prior reliance on Article 6(1)(b) UK GDPR) is again extremely exceptional.

2.5.11. Meta fails the overall balancing test

Given the initial unlawful collection of personal data, the exceptionally large and unlimited amount of personal data (including non-public data), the highly risky nature of the technology involved, the impossibility to object once one’s data is has already been used, the disproportionate market power that Meta exercises over its users, the existence of a further processing clearly unrelated to the original one, a scope of processing well beyond the expectations of the data subject and even a lack of compliance with the (minimum) industry standards, Meta fails the balancing test and consequently cannot rely on legitimate interest under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR.

2.6. Violations of Article 5 UK GDPR

In addition to the lack of a legal basis under Article 6(1) UK GDPR, the approach by Meta also violates Article 5 UK GDPR. Given the “multifactor” approach taken under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR, these violations also reflect back on the lack of a “legitimate interest”:

2.6.1. Fairness and transparency under Article 5(1)(a) UK GDPR

The extensive use of “dark patterns” when informing data subjects and allegedly allowing an objection (see in detail above at 1.5. to 1.7.), such as requiring logins to see public links or the filling out of complicated forms (when any objection is actually approved in 50 seconds), were clearly not “*fair*”.

The lack of proper information under Article 12 and 13 UK GDPR (see below) also leads to a violation of the transparency requirement in Article 5(1)(a) UK GDPR.

2.6.2. Purpose limitation under Article 5(1)(b) and 6(4) UK GDPR

As already highlighted under 2.3.1. above, Meta does not name any “specific purpose” for the processing of personal data via “artificial intelligence technology” but instead tries to make a specific means of processing itself the “purpose”.

Even if a technology for data processing were a “specific purpose”, it could never be a compatible purpose under Article 6(4) UK GDPR, as it may be used for wholly unrelated other purposes (see examples above under 1.2.2.). The use for “any purpose” can by definition not be limited to only “compatible” purposes. Furthermore, the processing for such other purposes was also not foreseeable for the data subject.

Under the criteria listed in Article 6(4) UK GDPR, it is clear that the processing of personal data shared by Meta’s users for the purpose of “*artificial intelligence technology*” is not compatible with the initial purposes, which is the provision a social network:

- There is no link between this initial purpose and the purpose of the intended further processing. Meta’s envisioned use of personal data for the training of AI-models is not due to any link with the initial purpose, but rather arises from the fact that such training needs large amounts of data and Meta happens to possess large quantities of data that it wants to bring it to use.
- The context in which the personal data was collected contradicts the use for the intended further processing. Information was initially shared on Meta’s platforms in order to participate in the social network provided by Meta and share information with certain people. The complainants and certainly also other Meta users did not anticipate that this information would be used to train AI models for all kind of undetermined future applications.
- The nature of the personal data, in particular the fact that special categories of personal data are processed, also contradicts the compatibility with the processing for training purposes of AI-models.
- The complainants can only speculate on the existence of any appropriate safeguards. It will be up to Meta to demonstrate in the ongoing proceedings whether such safeguards are in place. But even the existence of such

safeguards does not change the fact that overall the further processing is incompatible with the initial processing.

Since a compatibility test in accordance with Article 6(4) UK GDPR shows an incompatibility between the initial purpose and the further processing for the training of unspecified future "*artificial intelligence technology*", Meta could not base the further processing on a legitimate interest (even if there was a legitimate interest which is challenged in this complaint). Instead, Meta would have to obtain the data subject's consent if it wants to use the data for intended further processing.

Overall, Meta clearly violates the purpose limitation principle in Article 5(1)(b) UK GDPR.

2.6.3. Data minimisation under Article 5(1)(c) UK GDPR

As already highlighted under 1.2.1. to 1.2.6., Meta does not limit the processing of personal data in any way (scope, sources, types of data or time limits). Other than private messages with other individuals, all personal data will be ingested in the AI systems. There is also no limitation via anonymisation, pseudonymisation or other privacy enhancing technologies.

Thereby, Meta also violates the data minimisation principle in Article 5(1)(c) UK GDPR.

2.6.4. Accuracy under Article 5(1)(d) UK GDPR

We further note that AI systems still have a very low accuracy rate.⁴⁹ While AI generated pictures of people with four fingers may be tolerable, inaccurate information on an individual can lead to serious harm. It is likely that any results that relate to a data subject will regularly produce false results, which will likely violate Article 5(1)(d) UK GDPR.

2.6.5. Storage limitation under Article 5(1)(e) UK GDPR

As far as the information by Meta goes, it plans to process personal data ingested into its artificial intelligence systems indefinitely. This would likely constitute an additional breach of Article 5(1)(e) UK GDPR.

2.6.6. Accountability under Article 5(2) UK GDPR

As demonstrated under 1.3.2. to 1.3.3. above, Meta says itself that it is (i.) unable to separate between personal data that falls under the UK GDPR and personal

⁴⁹ <https://noyb.eu/en/chatgpt-provides-false-information-about-people-and-openai-cant-correct-it>

data that is not covered by the geographic application of the law and (ii.) unable to have a “clear cut” between personal data where Meta claims to have a legal basis under Article 6(1)(f) and personal data where users objected under Article 21(1) UK GDPR.

Reliance on a legal basis (like the claimed “legitimate interest”) requires that the management of the legal basis be operationally possible. By not even being able to demonstrate the (already otherwise erroneous) reliance on Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR, Meta is also clearly violating Article 5(2) UK GDPR.

2.7. Violation of Article 12 UK GDPR

As shown in 1.2. to 1.7., Meta does not provide “*concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible*” information according to Article 12 UK GDPR, nor does it inform the complainants in “*clear and plain language*”. On the contrary, Meta attempts to conceal information by using “dark patterns” as highlighted in sections 1.5. and 1.6. of this complaint.

Furthermore, as discussed in 1.6.-1.7. Meta is seeking to deter data subjects from exercising their rights by adopting a complex procedure instead of a “one click” objection. Thereby, Meta acts in violation of Article 12(2) UK GDPR, which requires the controllers to “*facilitate the exercise of data subject rights*”.

2.8. Violation of Article 13 UK GDPR

As is already apparent under 1.3., Meta’s new privacy policy violates Article 13 UK GDPR by failing to include several elements of this Article, as follows:

- Meta fails to inform the complainants of the exact purpose of processing, but simply names technical means (“*artificial intelligence technology*”). However, the disclosure of the specific purposes is obligatory under Article 13(1)(c) UK GDPR.
- Meta should have informed about legitimate interest it pursued in the processing, according to Article 13(1)(d) UK GDPR. Instead, the new privacy policy informs again only about the technical means (“*artificial intelligence technology*”).
- In relation to the duties under Article 13(1)(e) UK GDPR to name the recipients of any processing operations, Meta merely refers to any “third parties”. Given that this term includes everyone in the entire world, Meta does in fact not provide any information.
- Meta’s new privacy policy does not provide any information on the duration of the processing nor on the criteria used to determine it, as mentioned in

section 1.2.3. of the complaint, therefore violating Article 13(2)(a) UK GDPR. Furthermore, Meta fails to inform the complainants of whether the personal data will be “shelved” and/or when a new LLM could be deployed.

Therefore, Meta acts in violation of multiple elements of Article 13 UK GDPR.

2.9. Violation of Articles 17(1)(c), 19 and 21(1) UK GDPR

As shown above at 1.4., Meta takes the view that any objection or other finding that personal data is processed without a legal basis (anymore) would not lead to the end of processing within an artificial intelligence technology when data was already ingested.

This is contrary to the “right to be forgotten” and would instead limit the rights of data subjects under Articles 17 and 19 UK GDPR as well as under Article 21(1) UK GDPR to a mere “right to not have even more data processed”.

This is nothing but an official proclamation to openly violate the UK GDPR.

2.10. Violation of Articles 25 UK GDPR

From the documentation that was provided by Meta, it seems obvious that Meta has not entertained any technical and organisational measures to:

- limit the processing of personal data or the impact on the fundamental rights of data subjects (such as an opt-in system or clear controls for data subjects),
- implement an approach of data minimisation in practice,
- limit the processing only to strictly “necessary” personal data,
- limit the processing to anonymised or pseudonymised personal data,

or indeed any other publicly available and enforceable measure. By failing to do so, Meta has also violated its duties under Article 25 UK GDPR (“data protection by design and default”) when simply declaring the personal data of roughly 4 billion users worldwide⁵⁰ to be the “new oil” for any future AI machine.

⁵⁰ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/947869/facebook-product-mau/>

3. APPLICATIONS

Based on the above facts and law, and indeed any other facts or legal arguments that may arise during the procedure, we make the following applications:

3.1. Investigation under Article 58(1) UK GDPR

Given that some of the details of Meta's processing are unclear, we hereby apply for a full investigation using all powers under Article 58(1) UK GDPR, which should at least include the following steps:

- Clarification of the concrete "artificial intelligence technology" that will be used.
- Clarification of the personal data that will be ingested into such systems.
- Clarification on how Meta intends to separate UK personal data, data falling under Article 9 UK GDPR and data for which users have exercised choice (opt-in or opt-out) from data of data subjects that have taken the opposite decision.
- Clarification on the options to exercise the "right to be forgotten" under Article 17 UK GDPR, but also other UK GDPR rights (like the right to access or rectification) once personal data is ingested into such systems.
- Demanding any "Legitimate Interest" assessment that Meta may have conducted under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR.
- Demanding the record of processing activities under Article 30 UK GDPR (which previously only consisted of four (!) pages).⁵¹
- Demanding the documentation of any Data Protection Impact Assessment under Article 35 UK GDPR that Meta should have produced on these systems.

3.2. Preliminary stop of the processing activities under Article 58(2) UK GDPR

Given the exceptional circumstances of this case (see below), we apply to have a preliminary stop of any processing activities enforced under Article 58(2) UK GDPR.

As outlined under 1.1., Meta seems determined to start using the complainants' personal data for some types of AI technology. While these plans have been suspended, there is nothing that legally prevents Meta from resuming such plans at any point in time.

⁵¹ https://noyb.eu/geo/AR3/ROPA%20of%20Facebook_bk.pdf

As further detailed under 1.4., Meta takes the view that data subjects cannot (effectively) object to the ingestion of their data into AI systems after data processing has commenced as any such objections would only apply “*going forward*”, which seems to mean that personal data once ingested into an AI system cannot be “forgotten” or “unlearned” - contrary to the UK GDPR’s requirements in Articles 17(1)(c), 18(1) and 21(1). In other words, Meta says there will be no way back.

Furthermore, the fact that all personal data of more than 50 million affected people may be unlawfully processed is an additional factor that would constitute an “exceptional circumstance”.

We think it is urgently necessary and appropriate to at least delay the implementation of the use of personal data of over 50 million people in the UK until the matters raised in this complaint are sufficiently investigated and decided.

3.3. Corrective powers under Article 58(2) UK GDPR

Even before any investigation may have come to a final conclusion, we urge the authority to take imminent, preliminary steps to ensure that Meta does not pursue the processing operations any further, including but not limited to:

- Immediately issue a warning under Article 58(2)(a) UK GDPR, highlighting the unlawfulness of the intended processing.
- Order Meta to stop processing personal data of affected users for artificial intelligence purposes under Article 58(2)(d) and (f) UK GDPR.

3.4. Penalty

We assume that Meta’s violations of Articles 5(1) and (2), 6(1), 9(1), 12(1) and (2), 13(1) and (2), 17(1)(c), 18(1)(d), 21(1) and 25 UK GDPR overall amount to a clear intentional breach of the law - especially in the light of the ICO’s own guidelines as well as the extensive persuasive reasoning provided in CJEU, EDPB and EU supervisory authority decisions. We note that Article 83(1) UK GDPR require that the ICO issue fines that are “*effective, proportionate and dissuasive*”.